Flow correlation is the core technique used in a multitude of deanonymization attacks on Tor. Despite the importance of ow correlation attacks on Tor, existing ow correlation techniques are considered to be ine ective and unreliable in linking Tor ows when applied at a large scale, i.e., they impose high rates of false positive error rates or require impractically long ow observations to be able to make reliable correlations. In this paper, we show that, unfortunately, ow correlation attacks can be conducted on Tor tra c with drastically higher accuracies than before by leveraging emerging learning mechanisms. We particularly design a system, called DeepCorr, that outperforms the state-of-the-art by signicant margins in correlating Tor connections. DeepCorr leverages an advanced deep learning architecture to learn a ow correlation function tailored to Tor's complex network-this is in contrast to previous works' use of generic statistical correlation metrics to correlate Tor ows. We show that with moderate learning, DeepCorr can correlate Tor connections (and therefore break its anonymity) with accuracies signi cantly higher than existing algorithms, and using substantially shorter lengths of ow observations. For instance, by collecting only about 900 packets of each target Tor ow (roughly 900KB of Tor data), DeepCorr provides a ow correlation accuracy of 96% compared to 4% by the state-of-the-art system of RAPTOR using the same exact setting.
INTRODUCTION
Tor [16] is the most widely used anonymity system with more than 2 million daily users [74] . It provides anonymity by relaying clients' tra c through cascades of relays, known as onion-circuits, therefore concealing the association between the IP addresses of the communicating parties. Tor's network comprises around 7,000 public relays, carrying terabytes of tra c every day [74] . Tor is used widely not only by dissidents, journalists, whistleblowers, and businesses, but also by ordinary citizens to achieve anonymity and blocking resistance.
To be usable for everyday Internet activities like web browsing, Tor aims to provide low-latency communications. To make this possible, Tor relays refrain from obfuscating tra c features like packet timings as doing so will slow down the connections. 1 Consequently, Tor is known to be susceptible to ow correlation attacks [14, 51, 68] in which an adversary tries to link the egress and ingress segments of a Tor connection by comparing their tra c characteristics, in particular their packet timings and packet sizes.
This paper studies ow correlation attacks on Tor. Flow correlation is the core technique used in a wide spectrum of the attacks studied against Tor (and similar anonymity systems) [8, 20, 36, 38, 70, 72] . For instance, in the predecessor attack [83] an adversary who controls/eavesdrops multiple Tor relays attempts at deanonymizing Tor connections by applying ow correlation techniques. The Tor project adopted "guard" relays to limit such an adversary's chances of placing herself on the two ends of a target Tor connection. Borisov et al. [8] demonstrated an active denial-of-service attack that increases an adversary's chances of observing the two ends of a target user's Tor connections (who then performs ow correlation). Alternatively, various routing attacks have been presented on Tor [20, 38, 70, 72] that aim at increasing an adversary's odds of intercepting the ows to be correlated by manipulating the routing decisions.
Despite the critical role of ow correlation in a multitude of Tor attacks, ow correlating Tor connections has long been considered to be ine cient at scale [37, 55, 66] -but not anymore! Even though Tor relays do not actively manipulate packet timings and sizes to resist ow correlation, the Tor network naturally perturbs Tor packets by signi cant amounts, rendering ow correlation a di cult problem in Tor. Speci cally, Tor connections experience large network jitters, signi cantly larger than normal Internet connections. Such large perturbations are resulted by congestion on Tor relays, which is due to the imbalance between Tor's capacity and the bandwidth demand from the clients. Consequently, existing ow correlation techniques [34, 45, 53, 72] su er from high rates of false positives and low accuracies, unless they are applied on very long ow observations and/or impractically small sets of target ows. For instance, the state-of-the-art ow correlation of RAP-TOR [72] achieves good correlation performance in distinguishing a small set of only 50 target connections, and even this requires the collection of 100 MB over 5 minutes of tra c for each of the intercepted ows.
In this work, we take ow correlation attacks on Tor to reality. We develop tools that are able to correlate Tor ows with accuracies signi cantly higher than the state-of-the-art-when applied to large anonymity sets and using very short observations of Tor connections. We argue that existing ow correlation techniques [13, 34, 45, 53, 68, 72] are ine cient in correlating Tor tra c as they make use of generic statistical correlation algorithms that are not able to capture the dynamic, complex nature of noise in Tor. As opposed to using such general-purpose statistical correlation algorithms, in this paper we use deep learning to learn a correlation function that is tailored to Tor's ecosystem. Our ow correlation system, called DeepCorr, then uses the learned correlation function to cross-correlate live Tor ows. Note that contrary to website ngerprinting attacks [10, 27, 58, 75, 76] , DeepCorr does not need to learn any target destinations or target circuits; instead DeepCorr learns a correlation function that can be used to link ows on arbitrary circuits, and to arbitrary destinations. In other words, DeepCorr can correlate the two ends of a Tor connection even if the connection destination has not been part of the learning set. Also, DeepCorr can correlate ows even if they are sent over Tor circuits di erent than the circuits used during the learning process. This is possible as DeepCorr's neural network learns the generic features of noise in Tor, regardless of the speci c circuits and end-hosts used during the training process.
We demonstrate DeepCorr's strong performance through large scale experiments on live Tor network. We browse the top 50,000 Alexa websites over Tor, and evaluate DeepCorr's true positive and false positive rates in correlating the ingress and egress segments of the recorded Tor connections. To the best of our knowledge, our dataset is the largest dataset of correlated Tor ows, which we have made available to the public. 2 Our experiments show that DeepCorr can correlate Tor ows with accuracies signi cantly superior to existing ow correlation techniques. For instance, compared to the state-of-the-art ow correlation algorithm of RAPTOR [72] , Deep-Corr o ers a correlation accuracy 3 of 96% compared to RAPTOR's accuracy of 4% (when both collect 900 packets of tra c from each of the intercepted ows)! The following is a highlight of DeepCorr's performance: 2 https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/FlowCorrelation.html 3 To be fair, in our comparison with RAPTOR we derive the accuracy metric similar to RAPTOR's paper [72] : each ow is paired with only one ow out of all evaluated ows. For the rest of our experiments, each ow can be declared as correlated with arbitrary number of intercepted ows, which is a more realistic (and more challenging) setting. We hope that our study raises concerns in the community on the escalating risks of large-scale tra c analysis on Tor communications in light of the emerging deep learning algorithms. A possible countermeasure to DeepCorr is deploying tra c obfuscation techniques, such as those employed by Tor pluggable transports [61] , on all Tor tra c. We evaluate the performance of DeepCorr on each of Tor's currently-deployed pluggable transports, showing that meek and obfs4-iat0 provide little protection against DeepCorr's ow correlation, while obfs4-iat1 provides a better protection against DeepCorr (note that none of these obfuscation mechanisms are currently deployed by public Tor relays, and even obfs4-iat1 is deployed by a small fraction of Tor bridges [55] ). This calls for designing e ective tra c obfuscation mechanisms to be deployed by Tor relays that do not impose large bandwidth and performance overheads on Tor communications.
Finally, note that while we present DeepCorr as a ow correlation attack on Tor, it can be used to correlate ows in other ow correlation applications as well. To demonstrate this, we also apply DeepCorr to the problem of stepping stone detection [6, 26, 80] showing that DeepCorr signi cantly outperforms previous stepping stone detection algorithms in unreliable network settings. Organization: The rest if this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview preliminaries of ow correlation and motivate our work. In Section 3, we introduce our ow correlation system, called DeepCorr. We describe our experimental setup in Section 4, and present and discuss our experimental results in Section 5. We discuss and evaluate possible countermeasures against DeepCorr in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
In particular, ow correlation techniques can break anonymity in anonymous communication systems like Tor [16] and mix networks [15, 64, 65] by linking the egress and ingress segments of the anonymous connections through correlating tra c features [4, 14, 51, 63, 68, 78, 79, 87] . Alternatively, ow correlation techniques can be used to identify cybercriminals who use network proxies to obfuscate their identities, i.e., stepping stone attackers [69, 84, 86 ]. Figure 1 shows the main setting of a ow correlation scenario. The setting consists of a computer network (e.g., Tor's network) with M ingress ows and N egress ows. Some of the egress ows are the obfuscated versions of some of the ingress ows; however, the relation between such ows can not detected using packet contents due to the use of encryption and similar content obfuscation techniques like onion encryption. For instance, in the case of Tor, F i and F j are the entry and exit segments of one Tor connection (see Figure 1 ), however, such association can not be detected by inspecting the packet contents of F i and F j due to onion encryption. We call (F i , F j ) a pair of associated ows.
Threat Model
The goal of an adversary in this setting is to identify (some or all of) the associated ow pairs, e.g., (F i , F j ), by comparing trafc characteristics, e.g., packet timings and sizes, across all of the ingress and egress ows. Linking associated ow pairs using tra c characteristics is called ow correlation.
A ow correlation adversary can intercept network ows at various network locations. A Tor adversary, in particular, can intercept Tor ows either by running malicious Tor relays [8, 36, 83] or by controlling/wiretapping Internet ASes or IXPs [39, 70, 72] . We further elaborate on this in Section 2.3.
Note that in this paper we study passive ow correlation attacks only; therefore, active ow correlation techniques, also known as ow watermarks as introduced in Section 2.5, are out of the scope of this paper. Also, ow correlation is di erent from website ngerprinting attacks, as discussed in Section 2.5.
Existing Flow Correlation Techniques
As mentioned before, ow correlation techniques use tra c features, particularly, packet timings, packet sizes, and their variants (e.g., ow rates, inter-packet delays, etc.), to correlate and link network ows (recall that packet contents can not be used to link ows in this setting due to content obfuscation, e.g., onion encryption). For instance, the early work of Paxson and Zhang [86] models packet arrivals as a series of ON and OFF patterns, which they use to correlate network ows, and Blum et al. [7] correlate the aggregate sizes of network packets over time. Existing ow correlation techniques mainly use standard statistical correlation metrics to correlate the vectors of ow timings and sizes across ows. In the following, we overview the major types of statistical correlation metrics used by previous ow correlation algorithms. Mutual Information The mutual information metric measures the dependency of two random variables. It, therefore, can be used to quantify the correlation of ow features across ows, e.g., the tra c features of an egress Tor ow depends on the features of its corresponding ingress ow. The mutual information technique has been used by Chothia et al. [13] and Zhu et al. [88] to link ows. This metric, however, requires a long vector of features (e.g., long ows) in order to make reliable decisions, as it needs to reconstruct and compare the empirical distributions of tra c features of target ows. Pearson Correlation The Pearson Correlation coe cient is a classic statistical metric for linear correlation between random variables. Unlike the mutual information metric, the Pearson Correlation metric does not need to build the empirical distribution of the variables it is correlating, and therefore can be applied on a shorter length of data. The Pearson Correlation metric has been used by several ow correlation systems [45, 68] . Cosine Similarity The Cosine similarity metric measures the angular similarity of two random variables. Similar to the Pearson coe cient, it can be directly applied on the sample vectors of two random variables. This metric has been used by di erent timing and size correlation systems [34, 53] to link network ows. Spearman Correlation The Spearman rank correlation metric measures the statistical dependence between the rankings of two variables. The metric can be de ned as the Pearson correlation between ranked variables. The recent work of RAPTOR [72] uses this metric to correlate Tor ows.
Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor
Flow correlation is the core technique used in a broad range of attacks studied against Tor (and other anonymity systems). To be able to perform ow correlation, an adversary needs to observe (i.e., intercept) some fraction of ows entering and exiting the Tor network. The adversary can then deanonymize a speci c Tor connection, if she is able to intercept both of the ingress and egress segments of that Tor connection (by performing a ow correlation algorithm on those ow segments). Therefore, an adversary can increase her chances of deanonymizing Tor connections by trying to intercept a larger fraction of Tor's ingress and egress ows.
There are two main approaches an attacker can take to increase the fraction of Tor connections she is intercepting. First, by running a large number of Tor relays and recording the tra c features of the Tor connections they relay. Various studies have shown that an adversary with access to such malicious relays can increase her chances of intercepting the both ends of a Tor connection in di erent ways [3, 8, 28, 49, 83] . For instance, Borisov et al. [8] demonstrate an active denial-service-attack to increase the chances of intercepting the ingress and egress segments of a target client's Tor tra c. The Tor project has adopted the concept of Tor guard relays [21] to reduce the chances of performing ow correlation by an adversary controlling malicious relays, an attack known as the predecessor attack [83] .
Alternatively, an adversary can increase her opportunities of performing ow correlation by controlling/wiretapping autonomous systems (ASes) or Internet exchange points (IXPs), and recording the tra c features of the Tor connections that they transit. Several studies [22, 52, 72] demonstrate that speci c ASes and IXPs intercept a signi cant fraction of Tor tra c, therefore are capable of performing ow correlation on Tor at large scale. Others [20, 38, 39, 70, 72] show that an AS-level adversary can further increase her chances of ow correlation by performing various routing manipulations that reroute a larger fraction of Tor connections through her adversarial ASes and IXPs. For instance, Starov et al. [70] recently show that approximately 40% of Tor circuits are vulnerable to ow correlation attacks by a single malicious AS, and Sun et al. [72] show that churn in BGP as well as active manipulation of BGP updates can amplify an adversarial AS's visibility on Tor connections. This has lead to various proposals on deploying AS-aware path selection mechanisms for Tor [2, 20, 54 ].
This Paper's Contributions
While ow correlation is the core of a multitude of attacks on Tor [3, 8, 20, 22, 28, 38, 39, 49, 52, 54, 70, 72, 72, 83] , existing ow correlation algorithms are assumed to be ine ective in linking Tor connections reliably and at scale [37, 55, 66] . This is due to Tor's extremely noisy network that applies large perturbations on Tor ows, therefore rendering tra c features across associated ingress and egress Tor ows hard to get reliably correlated. In particular, Tor's network applies large network jitters on Tor ows, which is due to congestion on Tor relays, and many Tor packets are fragmented and repacketized due to unreliable network conditions. Consequently, existing ow correlation techniques o er poor correlation performances-unless applied to very large ow observations as well as unrealistically small sets of target ows. 4 For instance, the state-of-the-art correlation technique of Sun et al. [72] needs to observe 100MB of tra c from each target ow for around 5 minutes to be able to perform reliable ow correlations. Such long ow observations not only are impractical due to the short-lived nature of typical Tor connections (e.g., web browsing sessions), but also impose unbearable storage requirements if applied at large scale (e.g., a malicious Tor relay will likely intercepte tens of thousands of concurrent ows). Moreover, existing techniques su er from high rates of false positive correlations unless applied on an unrealistically small set of suspected ows, e.g., Sun et al. [72] correlate among a set of only 50 target ows. Our Approach: We believe that the main reason for the ine ectiveness of existing ow correlation techniques is the intensity as well as the unpredictability of network perturbations in Tor. We argue that previous ow correlation techniques are ine cient in correlating Tor tra c since they make use of general-purpose statistical correlation algorithms that are not able to capture the dynamic, complex nature of noise in Tor. As opposed to using such generic statistical correlation metrics, in this paper we use deep learning to learn a correlation function that is tailored to Tor's ecosystem. We design a ow correlation system, called DeepCorr, that learns a ow correlation function for Tor, and uses the learned function to cross-correlate live Tor connections. Note that contrary to website ngerprinting attacks [10, 27, 58, 75, 76] , DeepCorr does not need to learn any target destinations or target circuits; instead Deep-Corr learns a correlation function that can be used to link ows on arbitrary circuits, and to arbitrary destinations. In other words, DeepCorr can correlate the two ends of a Tor connection even if the connection destination has not been part of the learning set. Also, DeepCorr can correlate ows even if they are sent over Tor circuits di erent than the circuits used during the training process.
We demonstrate DeepCorr's strong correlation performance through large scale experiments on live Tor network, which we compare to previous ow correlation techniques. We hope that our study raises concerns in the community on the increasing risks of large-scale tra c analysis on Tor in light of emerging learning algorithms. We discuss potential countermeasures, and evaluate DeepCorr's performance against existing countermeasures.
Related Topics Out of Our Scope
Active ow correlation (watermarking) Network ow watermarking is an active variant of the ow correlation techniques introduced above. Similar to passive ow correlation schemes, ow watermarking aims at linking network ows using tra c features that Session 10A: TOR CCS'18, October 15-19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada persist content obfuscation, i.e., packet sizes and timings. By contrast, ow watermarking systems need to manipulate the tra c features of the ows they intercept in order to be able to perform ow correlation. In particular, many ow watermarking systems [29-31, 33, 62, 79, 85] perturb packet timings of the intercepted ows by slightly delaying network packets to modulate an arti cial pattern into the ows, called the watermark. For instance, RAINBOW [33] manipulates the inter-packet delays of network packets in order to embed a watermark signal. Several proposals [32, 44, 62, 79, 85] , known as interval-based watermarks, work by delaying packets into secret time intervals. While passive ow correlation attacks (studied in this paper) are information theoretically undetectable, a watermarking adversary may reveal herself by applying tra c perturbations that di er from that of normal tra c. Some active correlation techniques [12, 68] do not even aim for invisibility, therefore they can be trivially detected and disabled, making them unsuitable for large scale ow correlation. Additionally, while passive ow correlation algorithms can be computed o ine, ow watermarks need to be performed by resourceful adversaries who are able to apply tra c manipulations on live Tor connections. In this paper, we only focus on passive ow correlation techniques. Website Fingerprinting Website ngerprinting attacks [10, 24, 25, 27, 40, 47, 57, 58, [75] [76] [77] use a di erent threat model than ow correlation techniques. In website ngerprinting, an adversary intercepts a target client's ingress Tor tra c (e.g., by wiretapping the link between a Tor client and her guard relay), and compares the intercepted ingress Tor connection to the tra c ngerprints of a nite (usually small) set of target websites. This is unlike ow correlation attacks in which the adversary intercepts the two ends of an anonymous connection, enabling the attacker to deanonymize arbitrary senders and receivers. Existing website ngerprinting systems leverage standard machine learning algorithms such as SVM and kNN to classify and identify target websites, and recent work [67] has investigated the use of deep learning for website ngerprinting. In contrary, as overviewed in Section 2.2, prior passive ow correlation techniques use statistical correlation metrics to link tra c characteristics across network ows. We consider website ngerprinting orthogonal to our work as it is based on di erent threat model and techniques.
INTRODUCING DeepCorr
In this section, we introduce our ow correlation system, called DeepCorr, which uses deep learning algorithms to learn correlation functions.
Features and Their Representation
Similar to existing ow correlation techniques overviewed earlier, our ow correlation system uses the timings and sizes of network ows to cross-correlate them. A main advantage [23] of deep learning algorithms over conventional learning techniques is that a deep learning model can be provided with raw data features as opposed to engineered tra c features (like those used by SVM-and kNN-based website ngerprinting techniques [10, 24, 25, 27, 47, 57, 58, 75, 76] ). This is because deep learning is able to extract complex, e ective features from the raw input features [23] itself. Therefore, DeepCorr takes raw ow features as input, and uses them to derive complex features, which is used by its correlation function.
We represent a bidirectional network ow, i, with the following array:
where T is the vector of inter-packet delays (IPD) of the ow i, S is the vector of i'th packet sizes, and the u and d superscripts represent "upstream" and "downstream" sides of the bidirectional ow i (e.g., T u i is the vector of upstream IPDs of i). Also, note that we only use the rst elements of each of the vectors, e.g., only the rst upstream IPDs. If a vector has fewer than elements, we pad it to by appending zeros. We will use the ow representation F i during our learning process. Now suppose that we aim at correlating two ows i and j (say i was intercepted by a malicious Tor guard relay and j was intercepted by an accomplice exit relay). We represent this pair of ows with the following two-dimensional array composed of 8 rows:
where the lines of the array are taken from the ow representations F i and F j .
Network Architecture
We use a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [23] to learn a correlation function for Tor's noisy network. We use a CNN since network ow features can be modeled as time series, and the CNNs are known to have good performance on time series [23] . Also, the CNNs are invariant to the position of the patterns in the data stream [23] , which makes them ideal to look for possibly shifted tra c patterns. 5 Figure 2 shows the structure of DeepCorr's CNN network. The network takes a ow pair F i, j as the input (on the left side). Deep-Corr's architecture is composed of two layers of convolution and three layers of a fully connected neural network. The rst convolution layer has k 1 kernels each of size (2, w 1 ), where k 1 and w 1 are the hyperparameters, and we use a stride of (2, 1). The intuition behind using the rst convolution layer is to capture correlation between the adjacent rows of the input matrix F i, j , which are supposed to be correlated for associated Tor ows, e.g., between T u i and T u j . DeepCorr's second convolution layer aims at capturing tra c features from the combination of all timing and size features. At this layer, DeepCorr uses k 2 kernels each of size (4, w 2 ), where k 2 and w 2 are also our hyperparameters, and it uses a stride of (4, 1).
The output of the second convolution layer is attened and fed to a fully connected network with three layers. DeepCorr uses max pooling after each layer of convolution to ensure permutation invariance and to avoid over tting [23] . Finally, the output of the network is:
Note that our work is the rst to use a learning mechanism for ow correlation. In our search of e ective learning mechanisms for ow correlation, we tried various algorithms including fully connected neural networks, recurrent neural network (RNN), and support vector machine (SVM). However, CNN provided the best ow correlation performance compared to all the other algorithms we investigated, which is intuitively because CNNs are known to work better for longer data lengths. For instance, we achieved an accuracy of only 0.4 using fulling-connected neural networks, which is signi cantly lower than our performance with CNNs. which is used to decide if the two input ows in F i, j are correlated or not. To normalize the output of the network, we apply a sigmoid function [23] that scales the output between zero and one. Therefore, p i, j shows the probability of the ows i and j being associated (correlated), e.g., being the entry and exit segments of the same Tor connection.
DeepCorr declares the ows i and j to be correlated if p i, j > η, where η is our detection threshold discussed during the experiments.
The parameters (w 1 , w 2 , k 1 , k 2 ) are the hyperparameters of our system; we will tune their values through experiments.
Training
To train our network, we use a large set of ow pairs that we created over Tor. This includes a large set of associated ow pairs, and a large set of non-associated ow pairs. An associated ow pair, F i, j , consists of the two segments of a Tor connection (e.g., i and j are the ingress and egress segments of a Tor connection). We label an associated pair with i, j = 1. On the other hand, each non-associated ow pair (i.e., a negative sample) consists of two arbitrary Tor ows that do not belong to the same Tor connection. We label such non-associated pairs with i, j = 0. For each captured Tor entry ow, i, we create N ne negative samples by forming F i, j pairs where j is the exit segment of an arbitrary Tor connection. N ne is a hyperparameter whose value will be obtained through experiments.
Finally, we de ne DeepCorr's loss function using a cross-entropy function as follows:
where F is our training dataset, composed of all associated and non-associated ow pairs. We used the Adam optimizer [43] to minimize the loss function in our experiments. The learning rate of the Adam optimizer is another hyperparameter of our system.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we discuss our data collection and its ethics, the choice of our hyperparameters, and our evaluation metrics. Figure 3 shows our experimental setup for our Tor experiments. We used several Tor clients that we ran inside separate VMs to generate and collect Tor tra c. We use each of our Tor clients to browse the top 50,000 Alexa websites over Tor, and captured the ows entering and exiting the Tor network for these connections (we use half of the connections for training, and the other half for testing). Therefore, the entering ows are in Tor cell format, and the ows exiting Tor are in regular HTTP/HTTPS format. We used 1,000 arbitrary Tor circuits for browsing websites over Tor, i.e., each circuit was used to browse roughly 50 websites. We used di erent guard nodes in forming our Tor circuits; we were able to alternate our guard nodes so by disabling Vanilla Tor's option that enforces guard relay reuse. We also used a regular Firefox browser, instead of Tor's browser, to be able to enforce circuit selection. We used Tor version 0.3.0.9, automated by a Python script.
Datasets and Collection
Note that we did not set up our own Tor relays for the purpose of the experiments, and we merely used public Tor relays in all of our experiments. We captured the ingress Tor ows using tcpdump on our Tor clients. To capture the egress Tor tra c (i.e., tra c from exit relays to websites), we made our exit Tor tra c tunnel through our own SOCKS proxy server (as shown in Figure 3 ), and we collected the exit Tor tra c on our own SOCKS proxy server using tcpdump. Note that using this data collection proxy may add additional latency on the collected ows, so the performance of DeepCorr in practice is better than what we report through experiments. We also collected 500 websites through Tor pluggable transport to evaluate them as countermeasures against DeepCorr.
We collected our Tor tra c in two steps: rst, we collected tra c over a two weeks period, and then with a three months gap we collected more Tor tra c for a one month period (in order to show the impact of time on training). We have made our dataset available publicly. To the best of our knowledge, this is largest dataset of correlated Tor ows, and we hope it will be useful to the research community.
Note that while we only collect web tra c, this is not a constraint of DeepCorr, and it can be used to correlate arbitrary Tor tra c.
Ethics of Data Collection
To make sure we did not overload Tor's network, we ran up to 10 concurrent Tor connections during our data collection. Also, we alternated the guard nodes used in our circuits to evade overloading any speci c circuits or relays. We did not browse any illegal content over Tor, and we used an idle time between connections of each of our clients. As explained above, we collected our ingress and egress Tor ows on our own Tor clients as well as our own SOCKS proxy server; therefore, we did not collect any tra c of other Tor users.
In our experiments with Tor pluggable transports, we collected a much smaller set of ows compared to our bare Tor experiments; we did so because Tor bridges are very scarce and expensive, and therefore we avoided overloading the bridges.
Choosing the Hyperparameters
We used Tensor ow [1] to implement the neural networks of Deep-Corr. We tried various values for di erent hyperparameters of our system to optimize the ow correlation performance. To optimize each of the parameters, our network took about a day to converge (we used a single Nvidia TITAN X GPU).
For the learning rate, we tried {0.001, 0.0001, 0.0005, 0.00005}, and we got the best performance with a learning rate of 0.0001. As for the number of negative samples, N ne , we tried {9, 49, 99, 199, 299} and 199 gave us the best results. For the window sizes of the convolution layers, w 1 and w 2 , we tried {5, 10, 20, 30}. Our best results occurred with w 1 = 30 and w 2 = 10. We also experimented with {2, 5, 10} for the size of the max pooling, and a max pooling of 5 gave the best performance. Finally, for the number of the kernels, k 1 , k 2 , we tried {500, 1000, 2000, 3000}, and k 1 = 2000 and k 2 = 1000 resulted in the best performance. We present the values of these parameters and other parameters of the system in Table 1 .
Evaluation Metrics
Similar to previous studies, we use the true positive (TP) and false positive (FP) error rates as the main metrics for evaluating the performance of ow correlation techniques. The TP rate measures the fraction of associated ow pairs that are correctly declared to Size: 100, Activation: Relu be correlated by DeepCorr (i.e., a ow pair (i,j) where i and j are the segments of the same Tor connection, and we have p i, j > η). On the other hand, the FP rate measures the fraction of non-associated ow pairs that are mistakenly identi ed as correlated by DeepCorr (e.g., when i and j are the segments of two unrelated Tor connections, yet p i, j > η). To evaluate FP, DeepCorr correlates every collected entry ow to every collected exit ow, therefore, we perform about (25, 000 − 1) 2 false correlations for each of our experiments (we have 25, 000 Tor connections in our test dataset). Note that the detection threshold η makes a trade o between the FP and TP rates; therefore we make use of ROC curves to compare DeepCorr to other algorithms.
Finally, in our comparisons with RAPTOR [72] , we additionally use the accuracy metric (the sum of true positive and true negative correlations over all correlations), which is used in the RAPTOR paper. To have a fair comparison, we derive the accuracy metric similar to RAPTOR: each ow is declared to be associated with only a single ow out of all evaluated ows, e.g., the ow that results in the maximum correlation metric, p i, j . For the rest of our experiments, each ow can be declared as correlated with arbitrary number of intercepted ows (i.e., any pairs that p i, j > η), which is a more realistic (and more challenging) setting. 
EXPERIMENT RESULTS
In this section we present and discuss our experimental results.
A First Look at the Performance
As described in the experimental setup section, we browse 50,000 top Alexa websites over Tor and collect their ingress and egress ow segments. We use half of the collected traces to train DeepCorr (as described earlier). Then, we use the other half of the collected ows to test DeepCorr. Therefore, we feed DeepCorr about 25, 000 pairs of associated ow pairs, and 25, 000 × 24, 999 ≈ 6.2 × 10 8 pairs of non-associated ow pairs for training. We only use the rst = 300 packets of each ow (for shorter ows, we pad them to 300 packets by adding zeros). Figure 4 presents the true positive and false positive error rates of DeepCorr for di erent values of the threshold η. As expected, η trades o the TP and FP error rates. The gure shows a promising performance for DeepCorr in correlating Tor ows-using only 300 packets of each ow. For instance, for a FP of 10 −3 , DeepCorr achieves a TP close to 0.8. As shown in the following, this is drastically better than the performance of previous work.
On the practicality of false positive error rates Note that a 10 −3 FP may seem too large for a real-world setting in which the malicious AS/IXP is intercepting several thousands of Tor connections at any time. First, the results presented here are for Tor ows with only = 300 packets to demonstrate DeepCorr's unique performance on short ows (no previous work has done experiments with such short lengths of Tor ows with acceptable accuracies). As shown later, increasing ow length rapidly improves DeepCorr's correlation performance, e.g., from Figure 8 a ow length of 450 packets improves FP by close to two orders of magnitude compared to 300 packets (for a xed TP of 0.8). This is also evident from Figures 11 and 12 . Second, the correlation adversary can deploy a multi-stage attack to optimize accuracy and tra c collection. For instance, she can apply DeepCorr on the rst 300 packets of *all* intercepted Tor ows, and then collect more packets for the ow pairs detected by the rst stage of the attack. She then re-applies DeepCorr on the longer observations of those ow pairs. Third, the adversary can perform standard pre-ltering mechanisms to further reduce FPs, e.g., she can ignore all ow pairs with substantially di erent start times. In our experiments, all of the ows have the same starting times.
DeepCorr Can Correlate Arbitrary Circuits and Destinations
As discussed earlier, DeepCorr learns a correlation function for Tor that can be used to correlate Tor ows on-any circuits-and to-any destinations-regardless of the circuits and destinations used during the training process. To demonstrate this, we compare DeepCorr's performance in two experiments, each consisting 2, 000 Tor connections, therefore 2, 000 associated pairs and 2, 000 × 1, 999 non-associated ow pairs. In the rst experiment, the ows tested for correlation by DeepCorr use the same circuits and destinations as the ows used during DeepCorr's training. In the second experiment, the ows tested for correlation by DeepCorr (1) use circuits that are totally di erent from the circuits used during training, (2) are targeted to web destinations di erent from those used during training, and (3) are collected one week after the learning ows. Figure 5 compares DeepCorr's ROC curve for the two experiments.
As can be seen, DeepCorr performs similarly in both of the experiments, demonstrating that DeepCorr's learned correlation function can be used to correlate Tor ows on arbitrary circuits and to arbitrary destinations. The third line on the gure shows the results when the training set is three months old, showing a degraded performance, as further discussed in the following. 
DeepCorr Does Not Need to Re-Train Frequently
Since the characteristics of Tor tra c change over time, any learning-based algorithm needs to be re-trained occasionally to preserve its correlation performance. We performed two experiments to evaluate how frequently DeepCorr needs to be retrained. In our rst experiment, we evaluated our pre-trained model over Tor ows collected during 30 consecutive days. Figure 6 presents the output of the correlation function for each of the days for both associated and non-associated ow pairs. As we can see, the correlation values for non-associated ows do not change substantially, however, the correlation values for associated ows starts to slightly degrade after about three weeks. This suggests that an adversary will need to retrain her DeepCorr only every three weeks, or even once a month.
As an extreme case, we also evaluated DeepCorr's performance using a model that was trained three months earlier. Figure 5 compares the results in three cases: three months gap between training and test, one week gap between training and test, and no gap. We see that DeepCorr's accuracy signi cantly degrades with three months gap between training and test-interestingly, even this signi cantly degraded performance of DeepCorr due to lack of retraining is superior to all previous techniques compared in Figure 10 .
DeepCorr's Performance Does Not Degrade with the Number of Test Flows
We also show that DeepCorr's correlation performance does not depend on the number of ows being correlated, i.e., the size of the test dataset. Figure 7 presents the TP and FP results (for a speci c threshold) on datasets with di erent numbers of ows. As can be seen, the results are consistent for di erent numbers of ows being correlated. This suggests that DeepCorr's correlation performance will be similar to what derived through our experiments even if DeepCorr is applied on signi cantly larger datasets of intercepted ows, e.g., on the ows collected by a large malicious IXP. 
DeepCorr's Performance Rapidly Improves with Flow Length
In all of the previous results, we used a ow length of = 300 packets. As can be expected, increasing the length of the ows used for training and testing should improve the performance of DeepCorr. Figure 8 compares DeepCorr's performance for di erent lengths of ows, showing that DeepCorr's performance improves signi cantly for longer ow observations. For instance, for a target FP of 10 −3 , DeepCorr achieves T P = 0.62 with = 100 packets long ows, while it achieves T P = 0.95 with ows that contain = 450 packets.
Note that the lengths of intercepted ows makes a tradeo between DeepCorr's performance and the adversary's computation overhead. That is, while a larger ow length improves DeepCorr's correlation performance, longer ows impose higher storage and computation overheads on the tra c correlation adversary. A larger ow length also increase the adversary's waiting time in detecting correlated ows in real-time.
DeepCorr's Performance Improves with the Size of the Training Set
As intuitively expected, DeepCorr's performance improves when it uses a larger set of Tor ows during the training phase (i.e., DeepCorr learns a better correlation function for Tor with more training samples). Figure 9 compares DeepCorr's ROC curve when trained with di erent numbers of ows (for all of the experiments, we use a xed number of 1,000 ows for testing). The gure con rms that increasing the size of the training set improves the performance of DeepCorr. For instance, for a target F P = 10 −3 , using 1,000 training ows results in T P = 0.56, while using 5,000 ows for training gives DeepCorr a T P = 0.8. This shows that a resourceful adversary can improve the accuracy of her ow correlation classi er by collecting a larger number of Tor ows for training. Note that a larger training set increases the training time, however the learning process does not need to repeat frequently as evaluated before.
DeepCorr Signi cantly Outperforms the State-Of-The-Art
In Section 2.2 we overviewed major ow correlation techniques introduced prior to our work. We perform experiments to compare DeepCorr's performance with such prior systems in correlating Tor ows. Figure 10 compares the ROC curve of DeepCorr to other systems, in which all of the systems are tested on the exact same set of Tor ows (each ow is at most 300 packets). As can be seen, DeepCorr signi cantly outperforms the ow correlation algorithms Needless to say, any ow correlation algorithm will improve its performance by increasing the length of the ows it intercepts for correlation (equivalently, the tra c volume it collects from each ow); we showed this in Section 5.5 for DeepCorr. To o er reasonable accuracies, previous works have performed their experiments on ows that contain signi cantly more packets (and more data) than our experiments. For instance, Sun et al. evaluated the state-ofthe-art RAPTOR [72] in a setting with only 50 ows, and each ow carries 100MB of data over 5 minutes. This is while in our experiments presented so far, each ow has only 300 packets, which is equivalent to only ≈ 300 KB of Tor tra c (in contrast to RAPTOR's 100MB!). To ensure a fair comparison, we evaluate DeepCorr to RAPTOR in the exact same setup (e.g., 50 ows each 100MB, and we use the accuracy metric described in Section 4.4). The results shown in Figure 11 demonstrates DeepCorr's drastically superior performance (our results for RAPTOR comply with the numbers reported by Sun et al. [72] ). On the other hand, we show that the performance gap between DeepCorr and RAPTOR is signi cantly wider for shorter ow observations. To show this, we compare DeepCorr and RAPTOR based on the volume of tra c they intercept from each ow. The results shown in Figure 12 demonstrate that DeepCorr outperforms signi cantly, especially for shorter ow observations. For instance, RAPTOR achieves a 0.95 accuracy after receiving 100MB from each ow, whereas DeepCorr achieves an accuracy of 1 with about 3MB of tra c. We see that DeepCorr is particularly powerful on shorter ow observations. We zoomed in by comparing RAPTOR and DeepCorr for small number of observed packets, which is shown in Figure 13 . We see that DeepCorr achieves an accuracy of ≈ 0.96 with only 900 packets, in contrast to RAPTOR's 0.04 accuracy.
DeepCorr's Computational Complexity
In Table 2 , we show the time to perform a single DeepCorr correlation in comparison to that of previous techniques (the correlated ows are 300 packets long for all the systems). We see that Deep-Corr is noticeably slower than previous techniques, e.g., roughly two times slower than RAPTOR. However, note that since all the systems use the same length of ows, DeepCorr o ers drastically better correlation performance for the same time overhead; for instance, based on Figure 10 , we see that DeepCorr o ers a TP≈ 0.9 when all previous systems o er a TP less than 0.2. Therefore, when all the systems o er similar accuracies (e.g., each using various lengths of input ows) DeepCorr will be faster than all the systems for the same accuracy. As an example, each RAPTOR correlation takes 20ms (on much longer ow observations) in order to achieve the same accuracy as DeepCorr which takes only 2ms-i.e., DeepCorr is 10 times faster for the same accuracy. Compared to previous correlation techniques, DeepCorr is the only system that has a training phase. We trained DeepCorr using a standard Nvidia TITAN X GPU (with 1.5GHz clock speed and 12GB of memory) on about 25,000 pairs of associated ow pairs and 25, 000 × 24, 999 ≈ 6.2 × 10 8 non-associated ow pairs, where each ow consists of 300 packets. In this setting, DeepCorr is trained in roughly one day. Recall that as demonstrated in Section 5.3, DeepCorr does not need to be re-trained frequently, e.g., only once every three weeks. Also, a resourceful adversary with better GPU resources than ours will be able to cut down on the training time.
DeepCorr Works in Non-Tor Applications as Well
While we presented DeepCorr as a ow correlation attack on Tor, it can be used to correlate ows in other ow correlation applications as well. We demonstrate this by applying DeepCorr to the problem of stepping stone attacks [6, 26, 80] . In this setting, a cybercriminal proxies her tra c through a compromised machine (e.g., the Size: 100, Activation: Relu stepping stone) in order to hide her identity. Therefore, a network administrator can use ow correlation to match up the ingress and egress segments of the relayed connections, and therefore trace back to the cybercriminal. Previous work has devised various ow correlation techniques for this application [17, 33, 53, 59, 81] . For our stepping stone detection experiments, we used the 2016 CAIDA anonymized data traces [11] . Similar to the previous works [33, 34, 53] we simulated the network jitter using Laplace distribution, and modeled packet drops by a Bernoulli distribution with di erent rates. We apply DeepCorr to this problem by learning DeepCorr in a stepping stone setting. As the noise model is much simpler in this scenario than Tor, we use a simpler neural network model for DeepCorr for this application. Also, we only use one direction of a bidirectional connection to have a fair comparison with previous systems, which all only use one-sided ows. Figure 14 and Table 3 show our tailored neural network and our choices of parameters, respectively.
Our evaluations show that DeepCorr provides a performance comparable to "Optimal" ow correlation techniques of Houmansadr et al. [33, 34] when network conditions are stable. However, when the network conditions becomes noisy, DeepCorr o ers a signi cantly stronger performance in detecting stepping stone attacks. This is shown in Figure 15 , where the communication network has a network jitter with a 0.005s standard deviation, and the network randomly drops 1% of the packets.
COUNTERMEASURES
While previous work has studied di erent countermeasures against ow correlation and similar tra c analysis attacks [2, 9, 19, 35, 41, 42, 50, 56, 61, 82] , they remain mostly non-deployed presumably due to the poor performance of existing ow correlation techniques at large scale [60, 66] . In the following, we discuss two possible countermeasures. 
Obfuscate Tra c Patterns
An intuitive countermeasure against ow correlation (and similar tra c analysis attacks like website ngerprinting) is to obfuscate tra c characteristics that are used by such algorithms. Therefore, various countermeasures have been suggested that modify packet timings and packet sizes to defeat ow correlation, in particular by padding or splitting packets in order to modify packet sizes, or by delaying packets in order to perturb their timing characteristics. The Tor project, in particular, has deployed various pluggable transports [61] in order to defeat censorship by nation-states who block all Tor tra c. Some of these pluggable transports only obfuscate packet contents [56], some of them obfuscate the IP address of the Tor relays [48] , and some obfuscate tra c patterns [50, 56] . Note that Tor's pluggable transports are designed merely for the purpose of censorship resistance, and they obfuscate tra c only from a censored client to her rst Tor relay (i.e., a Tor bridge). Therefore, Tor's pluggable transports are not deployed by any of Tor's public relays.
As a possible countermeasure against DeepCorr, we suggest to deploy tra c obfuscation techniques by all Tor relays (including the guard and middle relays). We evaluated the impact of several Tor pluggable transports on DeepCorr's performance. Currently, the Tor project has three deployed plugs: meek, obfs3, and obs4. We evaluated DeepCorr on meek and obfs4 (obfs3 is an older version of obfs4). We also evaluated two modes of obfs4: one with IAT mode "on" [55] , which obfuscates tra c features, and one with the IAT mode "o ", which does not obfuscate tra c features. We used DeepCorr to learn and correlate tra c on these plugs. However, due to ethical reasons, we collected a much smaller set of ows for these experiments compared to our previous experiments; this is because Tor bridges are very scarce and expensive, and we therefore avoided overloading the bridges. 6 Consequently, our correlation results are very optimistic due to their small training datasets (e.g., a realworld adversary will achieve much higher correlation accuracies with adequate training). We browsed 500 websites over obfs4 with and without the IAT mode on, as well as over meek. We trained DeepCorr on only 400 ows (300 packets each) for each transport (in contrast to 25,000 ows in our previous experiments), and tested on another 100 ows. Table 4 summarizes the results. We see that meek and obfs4 with IAT=0 provide no protection to DeepCorr; note that a 0.5 TP is comparable to what we get for bare Tor if trained on only 400 ows (see Figure 9 ), therefore we expect correlation results similar to bare Tor with a larger training set. The results are intuitive: meek merely obfuscates a bridge's IP and does not deploy tra c obfuscation (except for adding natural network noise). Also obfs4 with IAT=0 solely obfuscates packet contents, but not tra c features. On the other hand, we see that DeepCorr has a signi cantly lower performance in the presence of obfs4 with IAT=1 (again, DeepCorr's accuracy will be higher for a real-world adversary who collects more training ows). Our results suggest that (public) Tor relays should deploy a trafc obfuscation mechanism like obfs4 with IAT=1 to resist advanced ow correlation techniques like DeepCorr. However, this is not a trivial solution due to the increased cost, increased overhead (bandwidth and CPU), and reduced QoS imposed by such obfuscation mechanisms. Even the majority [55] of Obfsproxy Tor bridges run obfs4 without tra c obfuscation (IAT=0). Therefore, designing an obfuscation mechanism tailored to Tor that makes the right balance between performance, cost, and anonymity remains a challenging problem for future work.
Reduce An Adversary's Chances of Performing Flow Correlation
Another countermeasure against ow correlation on Tor is reducing an adversary's chances of intercepting the two ends of many Tor connections (therefore, reducing her chances of performing ow correlation). As discussed earlier, recent studies [22, 52, 72] show that various ASes and IXPs intercept a signi cant fraction of Tor tra c, putting them in an ideal position to perform ow correlation attacks. To counter, several proposals suggest new relay selection mechanisms for Tor that reduce the interception chances of malicious ASes [2, 5, 41, 54, 71, 73] . None of such alternatives have been deployed by Tor due to their negative impacts on performance, costs, and privacy. We argue that designing practical AS-aware relay selection mechanisms for Tor is a promising avenue to defend against ow correlation attacks on Tor.
CONCLUSIONS
We design a ow correlation system, called DeepCorr, that drastically outperforms the state-of-the-art systems in correlating Tor connections. DeepCorr leverages an advanced deep learning architecture to learn a ow correlation function tailored to Tor's complex network (as opposed to previous works' use of general-purpose statistical correlation metrics). We show that with adequate learning, DeepCorr can correlate Tor connections (and therefore break its anonymity) with accuracies signi cantly stronger than existing algorithms, and using substantially shorter lengths of ow observations. We hope that our work demonstrates the escalating threat of ow correlation attacks on Tor in rise of advanced learning algorithms, and calls for the deployment of e ective countermeasures by the Tor community.
